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The Reconstitution of  Postwar Europe: Lineages of  
Authoritarian Liberalism 
 
Michael A Wilkinson* 
 
Abstract: The historical conjuncture reached in the European Union recalls the spectre of 
authoritarian liberalism, with politically authoritarian forms of government emerging in defence 
of practices and ideas associated with economic liberalism. Offering a long view of this 
formation, the paper traces its relation to the project of European integration from the 
interwar breakdown of liberal democracy to the ongoing Euro-crisis, by way of its postwar and 
post-Maastricht reconstitution. Postwar Europe was constituted to restore liberalism and 
protect it not only from sovereign violence and political nationalism, but also from the 
perceived threat of democracy. Contributing to the taming of sovereign authority, the erosion 
of constituent power, and the de-politicisation of the economy, this geopolitical 
constitutionalism functioned during the early years of the common market to produce a 
relatively stable settlement, through a mixture of supranationalism, ordoliberalism, corporatism 
and social democracy. But after Maastricht, and in the shadow of geopolitical transformations 
inaugurated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unleashing of global capitalism, Europe was 
reconstituted on a neo-liberal basis which left the European Union and its Member States 
unable to respond to financial crisis other than through circumvention of the rules and 
principles of integration, technocratic discretion and political and economic coercion. This 
response now prompts concerns of regional imperialism and German hegemony as well as the 
return of anti-systemic political parties, leading to a conjuncture reminiscent of interwar 
authoritarianism, as any democratic or constitutional alternative to economic liberalism and its 
ideology of austerity is obstructed. It might therefore be worthwhile to recall that the 
authoritarian liberal repression of democratic socialism in the interwar period was followed by 
an authoritarian illiberal counter-movement of dramatic, and devastating, proportions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
If the modern constitutional state represents the diachronic unity of ‘the people’, a 
lens through which to make sense of modern political concepts such as 
sovereignty, self-government, democracy, and constitutionalism,1 how is it 
affected by recent challenges to the state system, and in particular by the post-war 
project of European integration?  
The purpose of this paper is to sketch an answer to that question. In short, 
European integration, launched as a liberal functionalist project with a desire to 
build a ‘European Germany’ and to restore the modern constitutional state after 
its interwar breakdown, is transforming into an authoritarian liberal project in a 
‘German Europe’ with the effect of threatening the state’s most basic 
constitutional achievements.2  
This transformation of Europe, set in motion by its postwar and post-
Maastricht reconstitution, and accelerating in the present Euro-crisis phase is 
conditioned by a fear of democracy and the threat it poses to the liberal order. In 
the present conjuncture, this authoritarian turn is calling into question not only 
principles of constitutional government, but also the master concept of popular 
sovereignty and the scheme of political intelligibility of the modern state.3 But as 
yet, it offers no clear substitute for them.  
To unfold this narrative requires consideration first of the roots of the 
project: the interwar breakdown of liberal constitutionalism and in particular the 
decline of the Weimar Republic. The European constitutional imagination is 
configured, or so it will be argued, in reaction not only to the rise of aggressive 
nationalism, but to the perceived threat of democratic socialism that emerged in 
the interwar years. These political threats were thought to require a militant 
response in order to preserve a liberal political and economic order (or ‘ordo’), in a 
formation described by Herman Heller as ‘authoritarian liberalism’ (part II).  
European integration responds to these concerns through a process of 
reconstitution along three dimensions: a conditioning of sovereign authority, with 
the narrower aim of preventing German hegemony (inter-state relations); a 
reconditioning of political authority, which displaces the idea of constituent power 
with the new rhetoric of constitutional rights, triggered by concerns to avoid 
political extremism (state-society relations); and a restructuring of the economic 
constitution, first through ordoliberalism and later in the shift towards neo-
liberalism, with the aim of de-politicising the economy (economic relations) (part III). 
                                                      
1 See Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 69–73, 375–406, 342– 
367 
2 See Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘The Spectre of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional 
Crisis of the European Union’, German Law Journal 14 (2013): 527–560 and ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in 
the European Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?’, European Law Journal 21 (2015): 313–
340   
3 Cf. Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2014); Chris Bickerton, 
European Integration: From Nation-State to Member State (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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If these three constitutional-evolutionary dynamics combine to restore and 
safeguard the constitutional ideal in the wake of its interwar breakdown, the post-
Maastricht phase — represented by the reunification of Germany, the failure of 
the European Constitutional Project and a neo-liberal constitution of Economic 
and Monetary Union — signposts a different path: an increasingly fractious and 
unsettled European constitutionalism (part IV). 
Movement along this path has rapidly accelerated since the Euro-crisis, to the 
point that European integration is unable to maintain its animating constitutional 
ideals; it is beginning to reproduce — nationally and supranationally — forms of 
political authoritarianism in defence of economically liberal projects in general, 
and of austerity in particular, raising the spectre of authoritarian liberalism first 
experienced in the interwar years (part V).  
The new forms of imperialism that accompany this authoritarian turn elicits 
strong reactions domestically, from both Left and Right; these are then thought to 
require a ‘militant response’, to be subdued in order to restore or maintain liberal 
normality. The lessons from Weimar in particular, and the interwar period more 
generally, as drawn by Hermann Heller and Karl Polanyi, however, suggest an 
internal diagnosis of liberalism’s demise based on the generation of socio-
economic inequality rather than an excessive democratic tolerance (part VI).    
The paper will conclude by suggesting that a renewal of the legacy of 
sovereignty, self-government, democracy and constitutionalism in Europe depends 
on a recovery of the autonomy of the political from the economic realm. But this 
is demanded only by radical social movements and political parties which are 
marginalized by the European and domestic political establishments; whether it is 
compatible with the project of integration — or with conditions of contemporary 
capitalism — is doubtful (part VII). 
 
 
 
2. INTERWAR: A CONSTITUTIONAL PRELUDE 
 
To make sense of the postwar European constitutional imagination requires 
looking into its pre-history: namely, at the experience of the interwar period and 
specifically at what Carl Schmitt described as the decline of the jus publicum 
Europaeum — the ‘public law’ that governed relations within and between the 
states of Europe, and which consolidated the sovereign European state from the 
Peace of Westphalia to the outbreak of the First World War.4 It was in reaction to 
the perceived manner of this decline that Europe was reconstituted in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. 
                                                      
4 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum (trans. G. L. 
Ulmen) (New York: Telos Press, 2003 [1950]). Cf. Benno Teschke, ‘Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl 
Schmitt’s International Legal and Political Theory’, International Theory 3 (2011): 179–227; Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International law: Dealing with Eurocentrism’ Rechtsgeschichte 19 (2011): 152–
176 
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A principal, if often unacknowledged component of classical liberal 
constitutionalism, is the idea of state sovereignty which represents the external 
face of the constituent power from which the constitution draws its authority. 
Through the emergence of the jus publicum Europeaum, constitutional authority and 
sovereignty became inexorably linked. The modern state acquires its internal 
monopoly of legitimate force and establishes the secular, political foundations of 
its governing arrangements: ‘We, the People’.  Externally, the state is recognised as 
the only legitimate subject of international relations, with the right to decide on 
matters of war and peace subject only to conventions regarding civilized warfare. 
Through the consolidation of this double dynamic, a European ‘balance of power’ 
is attained from the early-modern age of absolutism through to the “golden age of 
the classical interstate system”. 5 
This is a crude snapshot of a complex picture. The emergence of the jus 
publicum Europaeum is a long and uneven historical process, but it crystallizes a 
series of conceptual distinctions that are key to modern constitutional theory: 
distinctions between the domestic and the international, the public and the private, 
state and society, the political and the economic.6 It reaches its apotheosis in the 
German tradition of Staatslehre, as typified by Jellinek’s formalization of the 
constitution, based on a holy trinity of ‘state apparatus’, ‘territory’, and ‘people’.7 
If this is the pure meaning of classical state sovereignty in the Euro-centric 
tradition, Carl Schmitt adds an elemental dichotomy to capture the brute historical 
reality of its geo-political formation, its stability dependent on the distinction 
between sea and land, Behemoth and Leviathan, a balance guarded by the 
maritime power of the British empire until its waning in the interwar period.8 In 
this early-modern through modern period, a concrete order (a nomos) based on land 
appropriation and claim to radical title overseas is established by European 
imperial powers, which underwrites the foundations of the modern liberal 
constitutional state in its age of colonial expansion and domestic consolidation.9 
This Euro-centric nomos came to a head, and an end, with the First World 
War, when the rules of civilized warfare were discarded and it became apparent 
that Europe was no longer able to maintain a global balance of power. The geo-
political balance is thrown into question, however not only by the decline of the 
British Empire and the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as 
rival global superpowers, but also by the fate of Germany, first weakened after the 
Treaty of Versailles and the establishment of the League of Nations, then 
                                                      
5 Teschke, above, at 181. 
6 See e.g. Martin Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’ in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 
Publishing 2003).  
7 See Martin Loughlin, ‘In defence of Staatslehre’, Der Staat 48 (2009) 1–28.   
8 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europeaum (trans. G. L. 
Ulmen) (New York: Telos Press, 2003 [1950]), 49, 352–353.   
9 Martin Loughlin, ‘Nomos’ in Thomas Poole and David Dyzenhaus (eds.) Theorists of Constitutional Crisis: 
Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt on Law, Liberty and State (Cambridge University Press, 2015); cf. Hannah 
Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt, (1951) 1968)), 123–157. 
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characterized by hegemonic rise and domestic descent into National Socialism and 
finally collapse and defeat in the Second World War.  
It is thus not only the classical interstate system that is threatened, but also 
the ideological fixture of popular sovereignty that characterised the ‘long 
nineteenth century’ beginning with democratic revolutions in France and the US.10   
This internal, domestic constitutional narrative to the collapse of the jus 
publicum Europeaum complements the geo-political frame.11 Germany arrives late to 
the stage of modern political and economic development, following its own 
‘Sonderweg’. Its conceptions of constitutional statehood and popular sovereignty are 
therefore concretized at a later stage than in France, for example, with its more 
deeply engrained revolutionary and republican traditions, but are for that reason 
less substantively entrenched in the German constitutional culture when they are 
placed under severe stress in the interwar period.12  
The Weimar republic was placed under stress not only by the humiliation at 
Versailles and the desire for Germany to restore its former imperialist glory, lost as 
a result of defeat in the Great War. The Weimar regime also broke down, or so 
liberal constitutionalists in the interwar period argued, because it was too tolerant 
and over-valued ideas of liberal equality, misplaced in the political and social 
turmoil of the time. Weimar constitutionalism was thus charged with complacency 
towards the political turbulence that democracy could and had led to during the 
1920’s and 1930’s, in Germany and elsewhere. Democracy needed to become 
constitutionally tamed — even ‘militantly’ — in order to protect itself from those 
at the political extremes who desired its destruction.  
The constitutionalist discourse of ‘militant democracy’ was a direct response 
to the breakdown of the Weimar republic and other liberal constitutions in the 
interwar years.13 The term was coined in 1937 by Karl Loewenstein, a German 
constitutionalist who emigrated to the United States when the Nazi party took 
power in 1933 and who later played a significant role in the American postwar 
reconstruction of West Germany.14 Beginning in the 1930s, he had urged liberal 
democracy to become more aggressive in resisting the spread of Fascism as a 
domestic and universal social movement, in particular by actively resisting the 
Fascist substitution of the romantic and emotional for the rational and 
constitutionalist in re-conceptualizing the methods of constitutional governance.15  
                                                      
10 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin, 1963). Cf. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 
1789-1948 (Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1962). 
11 See Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2000), 101–
115. 
12 Cf. Christoph Schönberger, ‘L’Etat de la ‘Theorie Generale de l’Etat’: Remarkes Comparatives sur un 
Discipline Specifiquement Allemand’ in Alain Chatriot und Dieter Gosewinkel, Figurationen des Staates in 
Deutchsland und Frankreich 1870–1945 (Oldenbourg Verlag Munchen, 2006). 
13 See Karl Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights Part 1’, The American Political 
Science Review 3 (1937): 417–432 and ‘Autocracy versus Democracy in Contemporary Europe Part 1’, The 
American Political Science Review 29 (1935): 571–593. 
14 See R. Kostal, The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the Legal Reconstruction of Nazi 
Germany, 1945–1946’, Law and History Review 29 (2011): 1–52.  
15 Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights Part 1’, 424.  
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Constitutionalism, according to Loewenstein (writing in the mid–1930’s) was 
under severe and imminent threat in numerous European states, both from 
Fascism and also, if to a lesser degree, from Communism.  It could not be 
protected by liberal democratic tolerance.  Rather, it required ‘militant’ — meaning 
extraordinary - constitutional protection, including the use of emergency powers 
and the suspension of fundamental rights and other constitutional guarantees if 
necessary.16 Instead, the Weimar Republic, Loewenstein insisted, “foundered on 
its own concepts of constitutional legality, which opened the way to power for 
Hitler.”17 
Fascism, in Loewenstein’s view, was neither a cogent political ideology nor a 
coherent political program, but “the most effective political technique in modern 
history”, serving opportunistically the purposes of attaining and maintaining 
political power.  Democracy must fight it on level terms: in Loewenstein’s own 
memorable words, it must “fight fire with fire”.18 Otherwise, liberal democracy 
would be manipulated by undemocratic and illiberal creeds, using it for its own 
destruction “under cover of the constitutional protection afforded by fundamental 
rights and the rule of law,”19 which would be casually discarded once power had 
been attained.  
But ‘militant democracy’, for Loewenstein, meant ‘militant liberalism’. The 
goal of ‘militant democracy’ was to serve and protect liberal capitalism as much as 
to defend liberal civil and political rights.  Capitalism thrives, he argued, because of 
the predictability of the rule of law, and not because of, but actually in spite of 
democracy and its potential irresponsibility towards the economy. In the same way 
that militant democracy was supposed to protect political liberalism from 
democracy, it was also, and just as importantly, supposed to protect economic 
liberalism and capitalism from democracy.  In both cases, it meant a replacement of a 
constitutionalism founded on constituent power with one founded on legality. 20 
In this way, constitutionalists re-established a conceptual linkage between 
liberalism, democratic legitimacy, and capitalism that was well perceived among 
19th century liberals, but whose conception of democracy was limited to a 
politically homogenous group of male property-holders.  The spread of universal 
franchise, in the Weimar Republic and elsewhere, had upset this comfortable 
linkage.  Weimar Germany exposed Europe to a new and tumultuous vision of 
democracy, one produced when universal suffrage was combined with class 
consciousness, intense party politics, parliamentary democracy, and increasing 
                                                      
16 Id. at 432.  
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Cf. Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’, Harvard Law Review 71 
(1958): 630. Cf. Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Thought (Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 129. 
 
 
Michael A Wilkinson              The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe  
 
 7 
local and regional claims to autonomy, including workers’ councils and 
movements of economic democracy and democratic socialism.21  
These socialist and democratic movements – as well as the reaction to them - 
were not of course limited to Weimar Germany, or even to Europe.22 Democratic 
turbulence reflected broader phenomena. Liberal-capitalist constitutional stability 
was threatened both politically, with heightened class-consciousness and 
increasingly fraught class conflict, and ideologically, through the association of 
legitimate constitutional authority with democratic responsiveness rather than legal 
constraints.  
If this fear of radical democracy, and specifically fear of a democratic 
transition to socialism (whether reformist or revolutionary), motivated the Fascist 
parties, the problem it posed for the conservative or liberal constitutionalist was 
equally apparent: “in a democratic age it was entirely possible that a legislature 
based on universal suffrage could chip away at the rules of property and contract 
which regulate the intercourse of bourgeoise society”.23 The very idea of popular 
sovereignty based on a ‘General Will’ was threatening when the politically active 
population (previously male property holders) was no longer a discrete and 
homogenous group. 
The liberal-constitutional reaction to the perceived threat of democratic 
socialism and economic democracy would be disparaged by Hermann Heller as 
‘authoritarian liberalism.’24 With this epithet Heller was taking aim not only at Carl 
Schmitt, one of the principle proponents of authoritarian liberalism and, until 
1933, an ‘implacable conservative opponent of the enemies of the Weimar state’,25 
but also at the centrist and conservative Presidential Cabinets advised by Schmitt 
that ruled late Weimar until the rise to power of the Nazi party. For Schmitt and 
other conservative and liberal constitutionalists, authoritarianism was seen as a 
necessary antidote both to the fragmenting processes of democratization and 
social pluralisation, and to the relativism of a formal and empty legal positivism, 
which were weakening the German state and endangering its Constitution.26 
Schmitt’s fear of radical democracy is apparent: 
 
Now the proletariat becomes the people, because it is the bearer of this 
negativity (that was Sieyes’ ‘third estate’: which was nothing and shall become 
everything). It is the part of the population which does not own, which does 
not have a share in the produced surplus value, and finds no place in the 
                                                      
21 See Maurice Glasman, Unnecessary Suffering (London: Verso, 1995). 
22 See e.g. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Holt Publishing, 1927). 
23 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy, above, 98. Cf. William Scheuerman, ‘The Unholy Alliance of Carl 
Schmitt and Friedrich Hayek’, Constellations 4 (1997): 172.  
24 Hermann Heller, ‘Autoritärer Liberalismus’, Die Neue Rundschau 44 (1933): 289–298, (Hermann Heller 
(trans S. Paulson), ‘Authoritarian Liberalism?’ European Law Journal 21 (2015): 295–301).  
25 See Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse 1750–1950 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 175. 
26 See Balakrishnan, above, 155–163.  
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existing order… Democracy turns into proletarian democracy, and replaces 
the liberalism of the propertied and educated bourgeoisie.27  
 
With notable exceptions in the tradition of Austrian liberalism (especially Friedrich 
Hayek), neither liberals nor conservatives of the interwar period envisaged the 
possibility of any return to the political laissez-faire of classical liberalism.28  In 
Schmitt’s view, restoring and maintaining liberal economic order required strong 
state action and even a temporary (or more permanent) suspension of 
constitutional democracy by commissarial (or sovereign) dictatorship.29 The 
‘sound economy’ — the maintenance of the conditions of the Bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat — now required the ‘strong state’: a motto that would later be taken up 
and reformulated by the Freiberg ordoliberals.30   
In the ordoliberal reformulation, the strong state was not strong by virtue of 
any democratic or popular support. Rather, it was one that was capable of 
upholding and enforcing the rules of the liberal market economy, and this would 
require a strong, juridical constitution as well as strong bureaucratic institutions 
capable of intervening to create, or at least approximate, the conditions of the 
liberal market society.  Whatever role democracy took in such a state (if any), it 
would have to be subordinated to these dictates. 
The founding members of the Freiberg school — economist Walter Eucken, 
and lawyers Franz Bohm and Hanns Grossman-Doerth — first met in 1933, the 
year the Nazis took power in Germany, as the period characterized by Heller as 
‘authoritarian liberalism’ was coming to a close. In working to identify the 
dynamics of the collapse of the Weimar republic, and to find ways of transcending 
the failures of classical liberalism, they would find themselves by the end of 
Second World War right at the intellectual centre of German post-War 
reconstruction.31 With the economists and sociologists Alfred Muller-Armack, 
Alexander Rustow, and Wilhem Röpke (who developed softer versions of 
ordoliberalism based on the slogan of a ‘social market economy’) and with the 
support of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s Minister of Economics from 1949 
through 1963 and then its Chancellor from 1963 to 1966, ordoliberalism would 
become the dominant ideology in post-War West Germany through the 1970s, 
albeit in practice tempered by the practical implementation of the social market 
economy and effects of neo-corporatism.32 
                                                      
27 Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, (trans. J. Seitzer) (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 271–272 
28 Cf. Tribe, above, 207–208.  
29 See generally John P. MacCormick, ‘The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional 
Emergency Powers’ Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence X (1997): 163–189.  
30 See Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism (University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1998); 
Werner Bonefeld, ‘Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordo-Liberalism’ New Political Economy 17 
(2012): 633–656.  
31 See, e.g., Tribe above; David Gerber, ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neoliberalism, 
Competition Law and the “New” Europe’ American Journal of Comparative Law (1994): 25–84.  
32 Id. 
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Ordoliberalism is a powerful rationalization of the fears of the weak 
democratic state, but locates that weakness in its incapacity to prevent the erosion 
of liberty through excessively accumulated, monopolistic, private power, as much as 
in its potential manipulation of the public powers of government. The ordoliberal 
focus on legal and constitutional means of protecting the liberal economic order 
from private excesses stressed the implementation of strict rules of market 
competition. Ordoliberals attributed Weimar’s decline to cartelization policies and 
resulting state capture by private interest groups, which allowed interwar Germany 
to degenerate into a corporatist state-industrial nexus that led inexorably to 
Fascism. It was the weakness of liberal constitutionalism in fighting monopoly 
capitalism as much as the threat of democratic socialism that occasioned the 
demise of the Weimer republic. 
Under these new liberal visions of the strong state, the ‘sovereign people’, if 
constitutionalized, could be reconstructed less as a threatening insurgent mass of 
radical constituent power, and more as a “formless source of legitimising 
acclamation… leaving the social property relations of old Europe unmolested.”33 
Liberal constitutional theory could then be reintegrated with European capitalism 
in an early version of the view that, in the jargon of post-war European 
reconstruction, would be labelled ‘restrained democracy’,34 encapsulated especially 
in the story of West German postwar constitutional development (in Christoph 
Möllers apt terms, “we are (afraid of) the people”35).   
To put it crudely, liberal constitutionalism and liberal constitutional theory 
became preoccupied with the legal manner of Weimar’s constitutional decline and 
transition to Fascism, to the neglect of its social and economic causes. The 
constitutionalist lesson was that the turn to Fascism is preventable if only 
extremist politics could be more firmly resisted by reinforcing liberal constitutional 
norms against democratic change and specifically against anti-liberal political 
parties (often reformulated in US constitutionalism through the rubric of 
preventing the ‘tyranny of the majority’).36 Liberal constitutional theory substituted 
a normative discussion of the ‘rule of law’ for any concrete enquiry into the ‘laws 
of rule’, of the conditions and causes of political order or disorder.  
Ordoliberalism — which was concerned with the causes of Weimar’s decline 
— focused only on one side, on the danger to the economic constitution of 
excessive concentration of private power in an unfettered market. It neglected the 
political concerns of social democracy; that not only economic but also political — 
and therefore social — freedom must be achieved for long-term constitutional 
stability. If the ordoliberal question was how to prevent capitalism from 
corrupting the free market economy, the democratic socialist question was how to 
                                                      
33 Balakrishnan, above, 100.  
34 See also Müller, above, at 128. 
35 See Christoph Möllers, ‘We are (afraid) of the People: Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism’ 
in M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 87–107.  
36 Cf. Jeremy Waldron, ‘Precommitment and Disagreement’ in Larry Alexander (ed.) Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press, 1998): 271–301.  
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prevent the free market economy from corroding and eroding political society and 
solidarity.   
The apparent success of the liberal constitutional re-imagination (whether 
ordoliberal or liberal constitutionalist), taming constituent power and sidelining of 
political democracy, was such that by 1966 Loewenstein concluded that, “the task 
of checking the bureaucracy which [Max] Weber had assigned to parliament was 
now effectively fulfilled by courts.” Parliamentarism, which in the nineteenth 
century “seemed to be the ultimate in political wisdom”, had by then suffered 
from “widespread devaluation”.37  Stability, it seemed, had largely been achieved, 
but on the questionable diagnosis that this was because both democracy and 
capitalism had been disarmed. 
What was the role of European integration in this new constitutional vision? 
The route to restoring and maintaining the liberal constitutional ideal in the 
postwar period was directed through three trajectories of constitutional constraint: 
restraining state sovereignty, displacing radical constituent power, and softening 
capitalist excesses but without democratizing the economy. European integration, 
it will now be argued, played a significance part in each. 
 
 
 
3. POSTWAR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE GEO-
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF AUTHORITY 
 
If the linchpin of the liberal political constitutionalism that had emerged during 
the course of the ‘long 19th century’ was the unconditional political authority of 
the state, this was conditioned in postwar Europe through the construction of 
international and supranational frameworks of law, politics, and the economy. 
This new process of constitutionalisation occurs both concretely and symbolically, 
formally and informally. The idea of ‘geo-political’ constitutionalism signifies that 
the conditioning of political authority occurs through institutional structures and 
practices beyond the state; this reshapes not only inter-state relations, but also state-
society and economic relations within and between states.  
In the geo-political reconstitution of Europe after the Second World War, 
three key interconnected questions thus emerge, relating respectively to state 
sovereignty, constituent power, and economic democracy: how to resolve the 
‘German question’ (to stabilize power relations in central Europe and prevent a 
return of German hegemony); how to prevent domestic descent into political 
extremism of both Right and Left, and how to stabilize the world economic 
system and prevent a repeat of the financial collapse and subsequent 
                                                      
37 Müller, above, 148 (quoting Loewenstein’s, Max Weber’s Political Ideas in the Perspective of our Time 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966), 48) 
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uncoordinated protectionism that characterized the 1930’s and proved so globally 
catastrophic.  
 
3.1. RESTRAINING STATE SOVEREIGNTY: IMAGINING A ‘EUROPEAN 
GERMANY’ 
 
The regional question for post-war Europe was first and foremost how to 
constrain Germany, to prevent its reemergence as a militarily or politically 
hegemonic central European power. This concern was based on distrust — felt 
particularly keenly in France, for obvious historical reasons — of German state 
sovereignty. 38  
The ‘German question’ largely disappeared from view during the period from 
the Treaty of Rome (1957) until the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) due to factors 
partly beyond the European sphere of influence: the division of Germany into 
East and West; West Germany turning inward to focus on its Wirtshaftswunder, 
helped by the cancelling and restructuring of large portions of its national debt in 
the so-called London Agreement of 1953;39 the broader effects of the US Marshall 
plan, serving economic reconstruction and trade, as well as political ends of 
stabilizing European liberal democracy in the hope of preventing any movement 
towards socialism in Europe.40 
The classical European nation-state was no longer fully in control of its own 
destiny.  This was clearly borne out in concrete terms by the American pressure 
that drove the resolution of the Suez crisis, humbling the pretensions of the 
United Kingdom and France to foreign policy autonomy.41 US control over the 
new and decisive geo-political element after the sea and land, in its dominance of 
air power,42 signalled the fading into the background of the ‘German question’ as a 
global issue. 
Adenauer’s West Germany — abdicating any regionally or globally 
hegemonic ambitions, which in any case would have been blunted by its position 
sandwiched between the rival superpowers — made the decisive political choice at 
the beginning of the Cold War to align itself with the US and with Western 
liberalism more generally (even at the expense of forgoing the possibility of early 
reunification with the East as a ‘neutral power’).43  
None of this is to say that European integration was an insignificant part of 
the new geopolitical settlement; it was an important feature of the transatlantic 
bulwark against the spread of Communism as well as a vehicle for restraining 
                                                      
38 See e.g. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Daniel Verdier, ‘European Integration as a Solution to War’, 
European Journal of International Relations 11 (2005): 99–135. 
39 The London Agreement on German External Debts 1953 
40 See Paul Sweezy, ‘Is the Marshall Plan an Instrument of Peace?’ Monthly Review 1 (1949): 80–83.  
41 See, e.g., Perry Anderson, New Old World (London: Verso, 2009), 10.  
42 Schmitt, Nomos, above, 352–353.  
43 See Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin, ‘Identity Politics and European Integration: The 
Case of Germany’ in A. Pagden (ed.) The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 296. 
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German ambitions, neutralizing its power through the dominance of French 
political influence on the process of integration from the outset with the Coal and 
Steel Community agreed at the Treaty of Paris in 1951.  
In postwar Europe, institution-building in the form of the EU (as it is now) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) could initially be viewed as an 
attempt to renew the jus publicum Europaeum, by prolonging the durability of the 
constitutional nation-state within Europe’s evolving regional setting.44 In this view 
European integration was less about inter-state politics understood as foreign 
affairs and more about contributing to domestic socio-economic prosperity and 
internal security, as the best way to avoid backsliding into political authoritarianism 
and the domestic oppression that accompanied it. 
Any project for creating a United States of Europe was sidelined early on, 
despite its strong support in the interwar period, especially by the German Social 
Democratic Party.45 With the failure of efforts to establish a European Political 
Community and European Defense Community (rejected in the French 
parliament), plans for political union were superseded by a supranational 
technocratic and juristic project and a symbolic domestic re-foundation of the 
constitutional state. Integration would ultimately be pushed forward by 
complementary and occasionally competing dynamics — uniting along 
teleological-economic, technocratic-juridical and symbolic-constitutional, rather 
than purely political or pragmatic intergovernmental lines.46 This would occur 
through national as much as supranational developments. 
The technocratic project to create a common market based on functional 
logic was associated with Jean Monnet, beginning with steps of ‘de facto 
solidarity’, in the words of the Schumann Declaration that led to the Coal and 
Steel Community. The juristic plan to create a federal-legal form of union was 
associated with the early jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice [ECJ] but 
encompassed a wider legal community.47 The domestic re-foundation depended 
on new constitutional ethos based on human dignity, fundamental rights, and 
openness to international integration, often codified in basic laws, most notably in 
West Germany. 
Accordingly, the EU was supposed to operate functionally as at most a ‘quasi-
federal’ polity, with an idiosyncratic split between normative-technocratic authority 
— which became strongly supranationalised through the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
(and national courts), and the bureaucratic expertise of the European Commission 
(and later the monetary authority of the European Central Bank [ECB]) — and 
                                                      
44 See, e.g., Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Verso, 1992). 
45 See Risse and Engelmann, above, 298 
46 See Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford University Press, 1958).  
47 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie de Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (26/93), Costa v ENEL [1964] 
ECR 585 (6/64); see Antoine Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of Judicialisation: Van Gend en Loos 
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political power, which remained predominantly with the component national units 
of the Member States.48 There was no successful attempt to recreate politically 
sovereign state structures at the European level. 
But basic elements of political power and authority were modified as a result 
of European integration. Substantive Member State equality was an important 
feature of the constitutional framework, pushing beyond the merely formal — and 
in practice illusory — sovereign equality of international law. So, for example, a 
balance would be achieved between larger and small Member States through 
allocation of voting in the European Council, digressive proportionality of seats in 
the European Parliament, and strict unanimity in the rules for Treaty Amendment. 
Informally, De Gaulle’s Luxembourg compromise demanded unanimity even for 
ordinary law-making.  
European integration was also a central feature of the state’s constitutional 
imagination, playing a real and symbolic role in reframing the constitution of 
domestic political authority. This is engrained in seminal constitutional texts — as 
in the case of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, which together 
with a constitutional ‘openness’ to international law, commits Germany to the 
establishment of a ‘united Europe’.49 Beyond this, commitments to belong to the 
European Union and be part of the project of European integration are strongly 
enshrined informally — there is little imagination in any EU state (with the 
possible exception of the UK) of any constitutional alternative to membership of 
the EU (or, since Maastricht, the single currency).50   
The goal of restraining (German) state sovereignty based on distrust of 
German power came to be reinterpreted from a German perspective as a 
collective self-limiting device; European integration was the external dimension of 
a strategy of domestic self-prevention. This has been called the ‘German interest 
paradox’: that it was in the German interest that German interests were not 
perceived as German interests. 51 
 
3.2. THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION: FROM CONSTITUENT POWER TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, both European and US political elites 
attributed the collapse of inter-war European liberalism to over-politicization, and 
to too much democracy rather than too little. Domestic re-foundation and 
European integration were initially conceived as components of a de-politicisation 
of state-society relations, restraining democracy so as to deter any renewed threat 
to the re-instituted liberal order.52  If the interwar period problematised the vision 
                                                      
48 See Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale Law Journal 100 (1992): 2403–2483. 
49 Preamble of the Basic Law (‘GG’) and Article 23(1) GG. 
50 Even in the UK, membership of the Union exerts strong constitutional pressures, see e.g. Neil Walker, 
‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’, Public Law (2014): 529–548 
51 See Franz Mayer, ‘Rebels without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s 
OMT Reference’, German Law Journal 15 (2014): 111–146. 
52 See Müller, above. 
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of constitutionalism underscored by state and popular sovereignty, the postwar 
response was to remodel it. The constitution would no longer be an expression of 
the authority of the constituent power, but of the authority, or even ‘sovereignty’, 
of the law.53 
This displacement of constituent power in the reconstitution of Europe is not 
without practical moment. It profoundly reshapes the constitutional imagination 
and restructures national constitutional politics. The dynamic also captures the 
political evolution of state-society relations — specifically the reform of 
institutions that mediate conflicts of interest between state and society, so that 
they operate in a manner removed from traditional sources of democratic 
authority.  
This trend within Western Europe, particularly in countries tainted by the rise 
of Fascism, to limit political democracy through the creation of juridified 
constitutional rights and other entrenched and judicially protected constitutional 
rules, accelerates throughout the postwar period, even in jurisdictions, such as 
France, normally resistant to the notion of ‘government by judges’.54   
The most draconian democratic limitation device is the use of ‘eternity 
clauses’ to prohibit constitutional amendment and to obstruct and evade 
constitutional politics (taming even the so-called derived constituent power). This 
is accompanied by restraints on the ordinary political-democratic process, with the 
outsourcing of political authority to ‘counter-majoritarian’ institutions — 
independent regulatory agencies, independent central banks, and strong 
constitutional courts — whose legitimacy is ‘expertocratic’. Oversight of these 
institutions is removed from the political process, vesting increasingly in 
administrative and judicial bodies that are themselves insulated from the 
democratic constituent power that undergirds the modern political-constitutional 
order.55   
These constitutional devices and institutions are meant to domesticate 
democracy, to avoid the perceived danger of it turning towards extremism of the 
Left or Right. The idea is to lock-in the constituent power through commitments 
that are then placed outside its control, sundering the constitution from the 
constituent power.  
There were informal as well as formal aspects of this development. Politically, 
the project of European integration coincided in Continental Europe with the 
domestic-constitutional ‘Christian-Democratic moment’, a reaction to the turmoil 
of the interwar period that sought, above all, political and economic stability.56 This 
was to be achieved through political centrism, Christian social thought (in both 
                                                      
53 See generally Francis Jacobs, Sovereignty of Law: The European Way (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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55 See e.g. Peter Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford University 
Press, 2010).  
56 See Müller, above, 132–150. 
 
 
Michael A Wilkinson              The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe  
 
 15 
Catholic and Protestant variations), and restrained capitalism as well as restrained 
democracy (explored further in the next section). If this was based partly on 
national policy formation, it was also characterized by a growing de-politicisation 
of society: combining class compromise, the de-radicalisation of organized labour, 
and the rise of (neo-) corporatism.57 In some countries, this de-radicalisation was 
even juridified and given a constitutional stamp of approval, the German 
Constitutional Court, for example, banning the Communist Party of Germany in 
1956, setting the benchmark for Germany’s new ‘militant democracy’.58  
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany had thus made a ‘basic 
decision’ in favour of a ‘substantive (as opposed to a formal) understanding of 
democracy, a set of values that had to be defended against its declared enemies.’59 
Although appearing fundamentally illiberal and anti-democratic in the abstract, this 
can only be properly understood in the context of a set of beliefs, captured by the 
idea of ‘constitutional patriotism’, which operates as a substitute for ‘the 
traumatized national self-esteem of West Germans’.60 
Just like restrained sovereignty, restrained democracy was pursued externally 
as well as domestically, and in combination of international and domestic 
commitments. The main developments were the creation of a regional human 
rights agreement, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the trade 
agreements and supranational Community institutions created by the Treaty of 
Paris in 1951 and then consolidated and extended by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
The European project would contribute to the movement of de-politicisation by 
modifying conceptions of legitimate government through its institutional 
structures and in particular its legal system, with the celebrated doctrines of the 
direct effect and supremacy of Community law as well as a principle of non-
retaliation, distancing Community law from the normal politics of international 
agreements.61   
But these developments required and depended on domestic constitutional 
reform and sustained management as much as supranational initiative. In 
constitutional terms, the substitution of constituent power with constitutional 
rights as the framing idea for the whole constitutional order thus occurs in the 
light of national, as much as transnational, and supra-national processes of 
‘constitutionalisation’.62  
                                                      
57 See generally Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends toward Corporatist 
Intermediation (New York: Sage, 1979). 
58 See Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Duke University Press, 2012), 291. 
59 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘A “Practical Dilemma Which Philosophy Alone Cannot Resolve”: Rethinking 
Militant Democracy: An Introduction’, Constellations (2012): 536.  
60 Ulrich Preuss, ‘Political Order and Democracy: Carl Schmitt and his Influence’ in C. Mouffe (ed.) The 
Challenge of Carl Schmitt (London, Verso, 1999).  
61 Cf. Bruno de Witte, ‘The European Union as an International Legal Experiment’ in De Burca and 
Weiler (eds.) The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 19–57.  
62 See Martin Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in Loughlin and Dobner (eds.) The Twilight of 
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Both regionally and domestically, “constitutionalisation,” it has been argued, 
“came as a masterly and opportune substitute for a real constitution, and law as a 
convenient expedient for politics”— effectively neutralizing political disputes by 
turning them into mere ‘technical matters’.63 Constitutionalisation aims 
progressively to de-politicize and de-democratize state-society relations, replacing 
political and democratic deliberation with juridical and technocratic forms of 
decision-making and norm-setting.  
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the early failures to establish a European 
political community based on a constitution authorized by the ‘Peoples of 
Europe’, the ECJ, and the European legal community more generally, pursued, at 
times aggressively, the legal fiction of a constitution.64 It was this fiction that 
authorized the shift from political constitution-making to judicial 
constitutionalisation, substituting the older idea of constituent power for a new 
idea constitutional rights as a legitimating device in the constitutional imagination. 
The interlinking of the supranational narrative with domestic constitutional 
developments is most famously articulated in the celebrated ‘dialogue’ between 
European courts and national courts through the so-called Solange jurisprudence, 
which prompted the construction of a set of unwritten principles of human rights 
law in the ECJ’s jurisprudence as well as the Europeanisation of domestic projects 
of constitutional reform.65  
To be sure, in European constitutional scholarship, there was always 
suspicion that the ECJ’s increasing juridification of superior fundamental rights 
norms was aimed primarily at elevating its own juridical authority over that of 
national courts, especially constitutional courts. If the ‘surface language’ of the 
Court’s jurisprudence was the language of human rights, Weiler noted, the ‘deep 
structure’ was all about supremacy.66 But provided there was no outright conflict 
between domestic and supranational courts, the system could remain functional, 
and even productive, eventually giving rise to various theories of constitutional 
pluralism, pluralist constitutionalism, contrapuntal law, and so on.67 
Constitutional rights — from being initially cast as liberal ‘trumps’ on 
governmental policy prescriptions in Dworkin’s influential narrative68 — had 
come to be considered merely as ubiquitous interests to be ‘balanced’. But if rights 
inflation undermines their rhetorical power, the doctrine of proportionality 
increasingly begins to dominate discussion of constitutional and administrative 
                                                      
63 Antonin Cohen, ‘Constitutionalism without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Mobilisation 
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review, in both domestic and transnational settings, maintaining judicial authority 
and the ideology of legalism.69  
The substitution of constituent power and democratic legitimation with 
constitutional rights and proportionality is not, however, merely a formal exchange 
of ideas. Once European integration is placed fully into focus, juridification of the 
rules of European law can be seen substantively to impact on domestic 
constitutional ordering, elevating economic freedoms (in the form of fundamental 
freedoms to trade) above social and welfare rights, as well as other non-economic 
concerns.70 To understand this transformation in full we have to turn to a third 
dynamic of constitutional change in the project of European integration: the 
economic constitution. 
 
3.3.  ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM ORDOLIBERALISM TO NEO-
LIBERALISM 
 
‘Economic constitutionalism’ means not only that political authority is increasingly 
conditioned by particular economic interests and ideas, but that the economy is 
increasingly viewed as the principal ground of authority for the ‘constitution’ of 
the polity as a whole — in the sense of defining and colonising the totality of our 
social and political relations.71 
The idea of an ‘economic constitution’, prefigured by Frankfurt school 
theorists Franz Neumann and Hugo Sinzheimer, but now associated with the 
Freiberg ordoliberals,72 is analogous to the efforts of Karl Loewenstein in the 
political sphere to depoliticize the basic rules of the game. Ordoliberalism thus 
called for the constitutionalisation of the economic sphere, protecting the 
conditions underlying free market competition, in an attempt to restore and 
prolong liberal constitutional ideals in the post-war era, insulating the economy 
from democratic interference as well as the corruption of excessive private power. 
Ordoliberal influence on the micro-economic constitution through the 
enforcement of competition rules is well known, but the idea of 
constitutionalizing macro-economic policy choices by making monetary stability 
and open financial markets as constitutionally significant as private property and 
contractual freedom would become vital to the shape of later European 
integration.73 In the ordoliberal constitutional imagination, independence of 
                                                      
69 See Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights (Cambridge University Press 2013); cf. David Beatty, 
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monetary policy from political influence is as important as the independence of 
the judiciary.74 
Ordoliberals and defenders of the (related) tradition of ‘social market 
economy’ considered the laissez-faire of classical economic liberalism to be socially 
and politically bankrupt. As against Friedrich Hayek’s brand of ‘paleo-liberalism’, 
they saw the economic order as constructed and maintained by strong state 
apparatus and strong constitutional rules, and not by a spontaneous evolution of 
the market and market relations. The conditions for competition would not simply 
take care of themselves: unbridled capitalism would be as self-destructive as 
unbridled democracy.75  
If to put the law above man, as Rousseau quipped, ‘il faudrait des dieux’ (one 
would need Gods), the ordoliberals answered the call for a new set of elites, who, 
confounding Rousseau, could, like Gods, finally ‘give laws to men’.76 If both 
democracy and capitalism, in other words, needed to be tamed, economic 
constitutionalism was the means to achieve this aim.  Ordoliberalism thus placed 
its faith in the economic constitution and a technocratic-juridical governance 
apparatus rather than in the political constitution to approximate the conditions of 
the free market and to maintain personal freedom through the market mechanism.  
There was no pristine application of ordoliberalism. Reinventing the classic 
legacy of state sovereignty and liberal constitutionalism for the postwar European 
age was in practice based on the domestic reconciliation of capitalism and 
democratic demands rather than any pure ordoliberal vision. In practice, during 
the ‘golden age’ of Europe from 1945–1975 (‘Les trente glorieuses’), a postwar 
political consensus tempered its economism, specifically through the national 
(neo-) corporatist state that tamed capitalism as well as democracy, and was 
founded on a social contract between labour and capital.77 Capitalism, in other 
words, was tempered not only by maintaining the conditions for competition but 
also by maintaining relatively harmonious labour relations.  
In the immediate postwar period, even Leftwing vanguard parties that had 
previously been officially committed to revolution, including the French and 
Italian communists, came to support emerging liberal democratic orders in 
Western Europe.78 In the words of Tony Judt, socialist parties contributed to the 
‘saving of capitalism from above’ by implementing social policies and contributing 
to the construction of the European welfare state, in diverse variants.79 
The European postwar state was charged, in other words, not only with 
ensuring the conditions of fair competition and price stability, but also with 
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moderating capitalist excesses and the inequalities it resulted it. Rather than any 
pretension of the state to reclaiming internal or external sovereignty, it was its 
success in negotiating these ‘diplomatic’ missions that came to be seen its raison 
d’etre. 
These were roles in which European integration could play a key part. As 
Giandomineco Majone, doyen of European integration studies, puts it: 
 
‘The possibility of separating economics and politics was a key, if implicit, 
assumption of the founders of the EEC. It was not a new idea but rather a 
return to a classical liberal tenet which in the nineteenth century and up to 
World War I had made it possible for the world economy to develop in such 
a fashion that “between national and international economic integration there 
was only a difference in degree but not in kind”.’80  
  
The economic benefits to be gained from free trade regimes through comparative 
advantage were of course part of the vernacular of classical liberalism since David 
Ricardo, although there was also recognition that unregulated free trade could 
increase inequality where levels of regional development are asymmetrical.81  
During the ‘golden age’ period, European integration sought to square the 
circle of economic modernization and market competition together with social 
protection and widespread material prosperity. The actual contribution of 
European economic integration to growth during in this period is disputed.82 
What is not disputed is that European integration was at least compatible with the 
pursuit of a ‘social market’ at the national level, in a European version of a twin 
track ‘embedded liberalism’.83  
And yet, if lessons had been learnt about the complicity of liberal 
marketization, rigid adherence to monetary stability, and high levels of socio-
economic inequality in the collapse of political liberalism in the interwar period,84 
they were soon to be forgotten. Beginning in the 1970s, domestic politics and 
European integration alike are gradually redirected, signalled by the renaissance of 
Friedrich Hayek, and ideas that only thirty years previously had been considered 
defunct.85 This period presages the new constitutionalism of neo-liberalism.86  
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In the turn towards neo-liberalism, the neo-corporatist nation-state is 
replaced by what Chris Bickerton has termed the European “member state”: this 
demanded the dismantling of the social contract between labour and capital, the 
unravelling of class compromise, and the freeing of capitalism from political 
constraints, including those deriving from concern for conceptions of the ‘public 
good’. 87 In this period, economic privatisation is combined with the rise of 
administration and regulation, and the (constitutional) role of the state becomes 
predominantly one of correcting for market failures.88 Under neoliberalism, 
market liberalization, economic efficiency, productivity, competitiveness and 
corporate empowerment become constitutional ‘ends in themselves’. 
In attempting to rewrite the terms of the postwar social contract by inserting 
a more laissez faire approach to political economy, two distinct avenues were 
pursued.89  The first was to introduce a strict determinacy to political discourse, 
that of ‘There is no Alternative’ (i.e., ‘TINA’) to economic liberalisation, which is 
particularly associated with Margaret Thatcher, but which increasingly infected her 
neo-liberal and third way successors. The second involved pleading the necessity 
of neo-liberal rules and obligations for both domestic and global political and 
economic stability.90  
Both avenues produced a substantive bias. In Fritz Scharpf’s narrative, the 
EU’s overall structural asymmetry promotes a neo-liberal turn by prioritizing 
liberal over republican readings of the constitution, and economically liberal over 
social welfare models of the relationship between state and society.91 As Scharpf 
argues, the ECJ played a significant role in this constitutional prioritization by 
elevating European market rules into directly effective and supreme 
‘constitutional’ law.  
The effect of substituting ‘integration through politics’ with ‘integration 
through law’ was not normatively neutral but therefore biased in favour of 
liberalization. Integration through law constitutionalized a set of market liberal 
rules, gradually attempting to homogenize an otherwise heterogeneous set of 
domestic economies. 92 Judicial authority, as became clear with the judgment of 
Cassis de Dijon, would be far more easily utilized in the service of deregulation of 
the economy than politics would be in its reregulation.93  
There are of course wider cultural aspects to this neo-liberal transformation, 
extending far beyond the EU, which contribute to the elision or even 
                                                      
87 See Bickerton, above, at 123. See also e.g. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time (Verso, 2013).  
88 Id. 107. 
89 See Bickerton, above, 95, citing the ‘Goldthorpe Report’ (John H. Goldthorpe, ‘Problems of Political 
Economy after the Postwar Period’ in C. S. Maier (ed.) Changing Boundaries of the Political: Essays on the 
Evolving Balance Between State and Society, Public and Private in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
90 Id. 
91 See Fritz Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multi-Level European Polity’ in M. Loughlin and P. Dober (eds.) 
Twilight of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2010), 89–120.  
92 Id. 
93 Case C- 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649 
 
 
Michael A Wilkinson              The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe  
 
 21 
pathologisation of ideas of the public or common good.94 The upshot is that the notion 
of the common good understood on a political register disappears; ‘instead we 
have optimization of market outcomes’.95 
This should be understood not as a departure but as an exaggeration of earlier 
trends. As constitutional theorist Carl Joachim Friedrich noted in 1955, and 
Foucault would later explore in his lectures on neo-liberal governmentality in 
1979, the decisive theoretical turn triggered by ordoliberalism had been to replace 
constituent power (or popular sovereignty) with individual economic freedom — a 
freedom to participate in the market — as the legitimating device for the whole 
constitutional order.96 Or as German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard put it: “The 
revolution of our era is marked by the call for freedom rather than for class 
warfare”, as if these must henceforth be strict alternatives.97 The economic 
constitution becomes the political form of the free economy, one based on formal 
equality, individual economic rights and the complete abolition of class struggle. 
The ordoliberals adopted and adapted Schmitt’s message of ‘strong state, sound 
economy’,98 but gave the sound economy a stronger legal-constitutional and 
administrative foundation; technocratic exercises of governance would be subject 
to constitutional safeguards and constitutionalised goals.  
Although it was far from straightforwardly applied or implemented at either 
the German or European level,99 ordo-liberalism’s particular constitutional 
prescriptions had reconfigured the constitutional landscape and the constitutional 
imagination. And its particular ideological linkage of neoclassical market 
economics and liberal constitutionalism was to become a key conceptual plank in 
the process of Europeanization and European constitutionalism.100  Its legacy 
could be seen, for example, in how the self-understandings of constitutional actors 
in Europe (including the ECJ and the European Commission) became been 
increasingly conditioned by ideologies and interests that correspond to the 
pressures of economic rationality and the logic of market competition. These 
trends become more acute in time, and of course extend far beyond the EU. The 
cosmopolitan economic neo-liberalism that is captured in the term ‘globalization’ 
can be understood as a direct descendent of ordoliberalism’s economic critique of 
the dangers of constituent power and democracy.101  
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The constitutional implications of neo-liberalism are in turn even more wide-
ranging. Political and social identity is fragmented, and increasingly commodified 
and quantified as merely consisting of a particular collection of individualist tastes 
and preferences — replacing the citizen with a simple consumer of economic 
benefits. And in terms of the political responsiveness of the new ‘debt state’ and 
its institutions in this period, the constituency that matters is no longer the statsvolk 
but the marktsvolk, ‘inaugurating a new stage in the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism’.102 The dominant means for the state to collect 
resources shifts from reliance on its citizens through direct taxation, to reliance on 
financial investors in the global marketplace. These changes were only fully 
realized, however, in the context of momentous geopolitical, political and 
ideological shifts that hit Europe at the end of the ‘short twentieth century’ (1991). 
 
 
 
4. NEO-LIBERAL EXCESSES, GEO-POLITICAL PRESSURES: 
‘MAASTRICHT AND ALL THAT’103 
 
If the postwar period demonstrated that European integration was at least 
compatible with social-democratic as well as liberal constitutional ideals (if not 
necessarily demanded by them), the Treaty of Maastricht and its surrounding era 
signals a turning point.  
Geo-political shifts of seismic proportions occur with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the reunification of Germany and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. With the 
Cold War coming to an end and the single market project (outside the domain of 
services) nearing completion after the legislative acceleration facilitated by the 
Single European Act (1986) and the ECJ’s activist jurisprudence, the sense 
emerges that Europe needs to find a new vocation, no longer required merely as a 
Western liberal bulwark against the threat of Soviet Communism or as a 
framework of harmonized rules for a single market. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union offers an obvious path, precipitating the 
future Enlargement programme, with membership of the EU opened up to the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe provided they satisfied the ‘Copenhagen’ 
criteria, respecting broad principles of liberal democracy and market liberalism and 
providing a new constitutional identity for the EU. Enlargement also prompts a 
discourse of constitutional closure (the ‘finality’ of integration),104 which 
foreshadowed the ill-fated Constitutional project (and was later a factor in its 
rejection by the French along with associated fears of neo-liberal globalization).  
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These geo-political and political reconfigurations reflected not only the 
triumph of liberal democracy but also the unleashing of a ‘disorganised’ global 
capitalism that had been in the making since the informal American Empire began 
to establish its global economic dominance in the aftermath of World War II.105 
Neo-liberal capitalism, as a political-economic system, had come to be seen as 
invulnerable and even invincible — as ‘the end of history’106 — since there 
seemed, literally, to be no longer any alternative to its free market ideology. 
Thatcher’s ‘TINA’ rhetoric was thus more widely effective in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, which also announced the emergence of the United 
States as a sole global superpower. “Since 1989,” the former standard-bearer of 
Frankfurt School critical theory Jürgen Habermas suggests, “it has become 
impossible to break out of the universe of capitalism; the only remaining option is 
to civilize and tame the capitalist dynamic from within.”107 
A new phase of economic integration in Europe had complemented the neo-
liberal revolution of the 1980s, facilitating the turn to financialisation of the 
economy through the dismantling of fetters on capital accumulation.108 This 
incorporated a loosening of capital controls, with the free movement of capital 
eventually becoming a fundamental legal and even constitutional value in the EU. 
The capacity of the state to raise revenue through taxation was diminished. And 
the political dominance of monetarism, already unleashed in the Anglo-American 
Thatcher-Reagan revolution, came to provide the foundation for the project of 
Economic and Monetary Union [EMU] launched at Maastricht.  
With its commitment to a de-politicised monetary policy based exclusively on 
price stability; and an independent but limited European Central Bank [ECB] (with 
restricted monetary tools but without the guidance of any supranational economic 
policy capable of dealing with uneven development, socio-economic 
heterogeneity, or exogenous fiscal shocks), the Maastricht Treaty attempted to 
supranationalise ordoliberal (and neo-liberal) principles designed for domestic 
constitutional consumption.109 The seeds were sown for the debilitating political 
and constitutional crisis that would engulf the Eurozone economies when financial 
crisis hit. 
But there was a geo-political dimension to this refoundation of Europe on 
the basis of economic and monetary union and a single currency. With the fall of 
the Berlin Wall inaugurating the reunification of Germany, ‘the German question’ 
— the question of how to prevent German domination of the European continent 
— had returned to the centre stage of European constitutional politics, where it 
had lain dormant for 40 years. In its compromise between French and German 
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interests and ideas, EMU seemed like a continuation of the usual course of 
European integration. The French saw it as a further strategy to prevent or contain 
the hegemony of the Deutsche Mark, the new ‘atom bomb’ anticipated to 
detonate in the light of German reunification and the re-emergence of Germany as 
a central European hegemon.110 But if the French got the single currency they 
wanted it was under the conditions the Germans demanded, with the ECB loosely 
modelled on the structure of the Bundesbank.111 
EMU also signalled a departure, initially thought to be temporary, from the 
idea of European unity, and the launching of what was euphemistically referred to 
as ‘variable geometry’ or ‘differentiated integration’: the ability to pursue different 
levels of integration through opt-ins and opt-outs (further formalized at the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1997). More generally, Maastricht called an end to the singleness 
of the Community Method of law making, beginning an era dominated by visions 
of ‘new governance’, ‘experimentalism’ and the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’, 
an era in which integration would no longer necessarily proceed in a constitutional 
or even legal fashion, but through ‘soft law’ and other informal processes of 
governance.112 
Maastricht therefore also signalled a departure from the previous, functional 
logic that economic integration would prompt political integration, and that 
politicisation would then force elites to engage mass publics in European matters, 
eventually precipitating a process of Euro-democratisation.113 On the contrary, 
EMU entrenched the de-politicisation of a key aspect of macro-economic policy, 
removing an important lever of power from the political pillars of the Member 
States, but without reconstructing it at the supranational political level. The new 
currency — a ‘currency without a state’ — was not only democratically 
unaccountable (which would hardly have differentiated it from national variants); 
it also lacked the social and political bonds of community to sustain it, offering a 
symbol of the new ‘economic Messianism’ of the era to follow.114 
Finally, despite its fragmentation - with its intergovernmental pillars in the 
area of Justice and Home Affairs and Common Foreign and Security Policy 
rendering the EU into a ‘Europe of bits and pieces’ — Maastricht signals a move 
from Economic to Political Union.115 Its most prominent symbol was the creation 
of Union Citizenship, an apparently dormant creature that the Court of Justice 
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nevertheless breathed some life into during the first decade of its existence, 
promoting cross-border mobility and prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in a series of bold judgments.116  
But ‘Political Union’ was nominal at worst, and half-hearted at best, given 
there was no attempt to construct any supranational political government. This 
more ambitious, constructivist, federal Constitutional vision of European 
integration had always existed alongside — sometimes in conflict with — ideas of 
re-inventing, preserving or transcending the sovereign nation-state. From the very 
beginning of the postwar period, the prospect of a post-national state — or of a 
European super-state– cast its shadow over the process of integration, or for 
those more federally inclined, cast its light over a path to the Promised Land. The 
federal project remained alive, even if only in the minds of scholars and 
visionaries.117   
This shadow was partly drawn, and occasionally erased, by factors external to 
the EU — by questions of Enlargement; geo-political security; and relations with 
third countries, accession and candidate countries, and other international 
organizations such as NATO and the WTO. But the notion of a common 
European identity as central to the development of a constitutional programme of 
closer European union was never entirely sidelined. It was briefly revitalised by 
Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida as a counterweight — in their view — to 
the belligerent, imperialist, market-fundamentalist values of the United States in 
their 14th February European ‘manifesto’, launched in reaction to the US-led 
invasion of Iraq.118  
Since Maastricht, however, the idea of a supranational constitutional state has 
inhabited a political and constitutional ‘no-man’s land’. On the one hand, there 
seemed little prospect of political elites pushing forward with a supranational 
constitutional state legitimized through a pan-European representative democracy. 
After the German Constitutional Court’s famous ‘Maastricht decision’, the 
warning signals against further integration were clearly marked.119 It was then 
constitutionally laid to rest, the Lisbon decision of the same court dashing any 
dreams of a European federal Constitution. The ambiguous ‘not yet’ for a 
European State of its Maastricht decision morphed into a decisive ‘never’ with 
Lisbon, at least not without a revolutionary constitution on the basis of a new act 
of German constituent power, a rather unlikely prospect.120 The most powerful 
domestic court in the region raises the demands of Germany’s core domestic 
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constitutional identity above those of European political integration, at once 
criticizing the EU’s democratic legitimacy and proscribing further 
democratization.121 
On the other hand, the prospect of regaining national sovereignty by exiting 
the EU is scarcely a considered option, either constitutionally or (with the notable 
exception of the UK) politically. Economic and monetary union had provided the 
new political symbol of integration, and the new supranational economic 
governance in the form of the European Central Bank. If this was a currency 
without a state, it also represented a new idea of states without a currency.  
The status of the EU — and indeed of its Member States — thus remained in 
limbo (where is still remains): not a mere international organization but neither a 
fully-fledged federal super-state, an entity sui generic or as Jacques Delors put it, an 
“unidentified political object”.122  
Although this has sometimes been celebrated in the literature as Europe’s 
Sonderweg,123 Europe’s inability to resolve the question of its own nature or of its 
constitutional consequences for its members — either as an emerging federal 
polity or as a project of state rebuilding — renders it exceedingly fragile in critical 
political and economic moments.124 Since Maastricht, centrifugal and centripetal 
forces have combined to make the project look increasingly precarious, especially 
in relation to the constitution of Economic and Monetary Union (explored further 
below).  
Contrary to its intent, the judicialisation of authority and increasing emphasis 
on liberal or ‘negative’ constitutionalism — on restraints of governmental power, 
particularly through economic constitutionalism (symbolized by the early case of 
Cassis de Dijon and the ECJ’s introduction of the principle of mutual recognition)125 
— has not lead to the perfection of liberalism or the triumph of liberal 
constitutionalism in Europe. Instead it has led to an increasing and interrelated 
contestation, and outright conflict: geo-politically, between core and peripheral 
EU states; politically, between different levels of government (e.g., national and 
supranational, sub-national and supranational, and national and sub-national); and 
ideologically, between different substantive visions of the good life (e.g., neo-
liberal, republican, social-democratic).126 Far from subduing politics, judicial 
constitutionalisation of social and economic conflicts has heightened and renewed 
political and constitutional tensions. 
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A fuller account of the duality between supranational normative structure and 
national political power (‘dual supranationalism’)127 must therefore reject any 
formalistic picture of a balanced bifurcation of legal and political pillars and 
capture their dysfunctional inter-relation: signified by two decades of doubt, 
beginning with the political and constitutional challenges to Maastricht in the 
French and Danish referenda, and in the German Constitutional Court; continuing 
through the failed Constitutional experiment and subsequent ‘reform’ Treaty of 
Lisbon; and culminating with the Euro-crisis and the more direct constitutional 
challenges that has brought in its wake.  
An account of Europe’s Sonderweg now needs to be corrected and updated to 
include the effects of asymmetric domestic political power and authority and a 
single currency that deprives Member States of the Eurozone of one of the few 
levers left to regain competitiveness.  The substantive constitutional effects of an 
economic supranationalism spearheaded by the symbolic unity of a single currency 
and an (increasingly) asymmetric political inter-governmentalism are captured in 
the voguish label, a ‘German Europe’.128 Is this Europe’s new Sonderweg? 
 
 
 
5. EURO-CRISIS: THE SPECTRE OF AUTHORITARIAN 
LIBERALISM 
 
The cumulative effect of integration in its ordo- and neo-liberal phases and 
especially in the post-Maastricht construction of EMU has been to transform the 
constitutional state by opposing (rather than uniting) state-society relations: 
delinking the sovereign powers of the state from the constituent power of the 
people. This is a foundational shift, because central to the constitutional 
imagination has always been not only that the powers of the state have to be 
limited (as liberalism recommends), but that they have to be limited in the name of 
‘the people’ or at least recognizable as a process of collective self-limitation (as 
democracy demands).  In the neo-liberal constitution, by contrast, the powers of 
the state are constrained, not by ‘the people’ — but by the ‘the market’ and by 
institutions that are technocratic rather than democratically responsible.129   
Geo-political, political and ideological changes have combined to transform 
the Keynesian-Westphalian state of the postwar ‘golden age’ into a Hayekian-
cosmopolitan state. Class struggle within nations is rhetorically replaced by 
competitive struggle between nations, liberalism is increasingly disembedded, 
private debt is turned into public debt, and capitalist excesses are normalised along 
with the need for public sector and ‘structural’ reform. And functional imperatives 
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of market integration are advanced to justify the bypassing or suspension of 
normal democratic and constitutional procedures in response to a financial crisis 
that appears to be unending.  
If politically-liberal constitutional democracy is increasingly replaced by an 
economically-liberal constitutional oligarchy, which increasingly interferes with 
everyday governing processes, this is provoking increasing popular dislocation and 
resentment as well as anti-systemic reaction. When ‘government is both ubiquitous 
and increasingly remote from ordinary people’, it threatens to distort the lens of 
the state as a symbolic representation of the people and of sovereignty as a 
representation of the relations between rulers and ruled.130  
Although this is a global phenomenon, financial crisis beginning in the US 
with the collapse of Lehman brothers in 2007, the current conjuncture in Europe 
seems particularly stark. Political tensions between European core and periphery 
and between classes within nations are not resolved by democratic debate and 
contestation, but placated, if at all, by a system of managerial control and selective 
appeals to the obligations in the Treaty or in the domestic constitutional culture. 
Standing above the conflict and tensions are thus said to be ‘the rules of the game’: 
the European Treaties (the EU’s ‘constitutional charter’), which are supposed to 
prohibit, for example, unconditional bail-outs or serious debt restructuring for the 
periphery.131 Constraints result not only from resistance on the part of the creditor 
states and the ‘Troika’ (i.e., the ECB, European Commission, and International 
Monetary Fund) to transnational solidarity, but from rhetorical principles such as 
the ‘avoidance of moral hazard’ and the maintenance of ‘fiscal discipline’ which 
are increasingly considered part of the constitutional fabric of the EU.132  
Whether the treatment of debtor states is economically rational in any 
meaningful way is doubtful, certainly in the medium-term. The Troika’s 
unwillingness to restructure Greek debt or relax strict conditionality, for example, 
may well frustrate the surest route to growth and to repayment of creditors. But to 
appear lenient would be to violate a new shibboleth of neo-liberal political-
economic rationality — ‘austerity’ — irrespective of the extent to which that 
might affect national democracy and domestic economic policy.133   
Alongside this strong insistence on austerity and ‘playing by the rules’ of the 
economic constitution (anyway self-serving given their initial violation by creditor 
countries such as France and Germany),134 there has been increasing resort to 
highly discretionary and intrusive managerial governance as well as informal 
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pressures.135 This can be seen not only in the memoranda of understanding 
negotiated by the Troika with countries in receipt of financial assistance, and in the 
latitude given to the European Central Bank in its unorthodox measures of 
monetary policy — such as bond-buying on the secondary market, becoming a 
qualified ‘lender of last resort’, or restricting emergency liquidity to national banks 
facing immediate financial collapse,136 — but also in the political coercing and 
cajoling from powerful states and supranational institutions.  
In combination this suggests a transformation of Economic and Monetary 
Union from a rule-based institution to a highly discretionary one, sidelining the 
ordoliberal faith in liberal-constitutionalism and raising the spectre of an 
‘authoritarian liberalism’, at once reminiscent but distant from its earlier interwar 
incarnation.137 
The first, ‘authoritarian’, element of authoritarian liberalism shows in a twin 
development of de-democratisation and de-legalisation of integration and the 
second, ‘liberal’, element points to a liberal market teleology as the over-riding 
objective of the formal and informal constitution of Europe. 
 
5.1.  DE-DEMOCRATISATION AND DE-LEGALISATION 
 
The continuing de-democratisation of European integration is evident in the 
manner through which economic crisis measures — such as the conditionality 
attached to European stability mechanisms, country specific recommendations in 
the European semester, and outright monetary transactions (OMT) promised by 
the ECB — increasingly avoid or evade normal democratic debate and political 
contestation, whether these measures are enacted by European institutions directly 
or are rubber-stamped by domestic actors under unusual pressures of urgency or 
‘emergency’.138  
De-democratisation continues, even if now in accelerated form, the 
ideological currents of ordo- and neo-liberalism discussed above: not only is there 
‘no alternative’ to market capitalism there is specifically no alternative to austerity 
and neo-liberal structural reforms, meaning privatization of state assets, pension 
reforms, increases in regressive taxation such as VAT, and public sector and social 
welfare cuts. These are the only means to regain competitiveness and avoid the 
‘moral hazard’ that would otherwise be entailed by unconditional assistance or 
assistance that would violate terms that would (or may) have been preferred by the 
financial markets.  
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The turn towards de-legalisation is a more complex shift, not least since the 
move away from the normal Community method of law-making, as we saw, 
predates the Eurocrisis.139 It can be found in the increasing displacement of formal 
legal instruments and institutions with less formal, non-legal instruments, or with 
outright coercion, circumventing judicial and constitutional review. These include 
‘hard-soft law’ such as ‘recommendations’ and ‘opinions’ in place of legislation, 
which despite their nomenclature are imposed on the recipient (debtor) state, 
pushed through without normal procedures of democratic deliberation by 
domestic elites, however willingly or otherwise. The new ‘Union (rather than 
‘Community’) method’ of rule-making bypasses representative institutions, 
national as well as European, and suffers from even greater democratic deficits 
than its Community predecessor.140  
The ECJ has been unwilling, and anyway perhaps powerless to intervene. In 
its decision in Pringle v Republic of Ireland on the validity of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM),141 the Court elevates the Member State’s interest in defending 
the ‘financial stability of the Euro zone as a whole’ by offering a bail-out fund 
above the EU interest in respecting the constitutional framework as set out in the 
EU treaties or fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Charter.142 In OMT, the 
ECJ — despite the protestations of the German Constitutional Court, and in its 
first ever referral,143 — waved through discretionary exercise of institutional power 
by the ECB that goes far beyond what is suggested by its constitutional mandate. 
Outright and direct constitutional conflict between the two most powerful courts 
in the region, long postponed, now beckons.144   
If legality was a liberal substitute for democratic legitimacy, or a 
counterbalance to a process of de-democratisation with deeper roots in the project 
of integration, the turn away from the legal form, while continuing the process of 
de-democratization, is a move of tremendous constitutional significance.  
Emergency measures are thus able to escape constitutional and administrative 
review by courts, which in the absence of democratic processes of norm creation 
represent the only avenue through which the disciplining effect of fundamental 
rights (whether emanating from the domestic, European, or international levels), 
such as the right to social security or to basic healthcare, can be secured.  Indeed, 
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de-legalization itself can violate fundamental rights, denying access to justice by 
preventing legal challenges altogether.145 
There is of course nothing new in government resorting to extraordinary 
measures — formal as well as informal — in times of crisis or emergency in an 
attempt to restore order, security, or a return to economic normality;146 nor in a 
compliant judiciary. What is distinct in the wake of the raft of measures 
implemented since the Euro-crisis is the way extraordinary measures appear to be 
becoming the ‘new normal’, rather than exceptional or temporary.147 Thus, they 
are rarely justified on the basis of needing to respond to an ‘emergency’, at least 
not one that will be over at any identifiable future point.  Rather, their justification 
lies in the need to assuage the markets, and to maintain the ‘singleness’ of the 
currency. There is nothing distinctly temporary about these needs — they are the 
products of an ideology, not of a particular situation. In true Schmittian fashion, 
an enemy has even been identified; the ‘enemy within’ the authoritarian liberal 
constitutional project are those ‘bad Europeans’ who disregard the economic 
stability criteria.148 
The gestures towards tightening up the rules and maintaining an even harsher 
surveillance model of Member State’s budgets are proffered with little 
consideration of its effect on the principles of liberal democracy. The Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure, which stipulates sanctions against Member States for failure 
to conform ‘is meant to be an entirely discretionary regime whose scope of 
delegated authority far exceeds the limits of generally allowable delegation in 
constitutional democracies.’149  
Liberal constitutional ‘integration through law’ has been replaced by a liberal-
authoritarian ‘integration through fear’,150 a process not limited to economic 
integration: thus a weakening of usual avenues of political and legal accountability 
can be found in the field of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and in 
particular the development of European criminal law through mutual recognition 
of judgments in the framework of the European Arrest Warrant.151 
 
5.2.  LIBERAL ECONOMIC TELEOLOGY 
 
What then is liberal about authoritarian liberalism? To be sure, authoritarian 
liberalism might not appear ‘liberal’ in any orthodox sense. De-democratisation 
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does not straightforwardly fit the classical liberal constitutional mind-set; de-
legalisation still less so. If democracy has always had an uneasy role in the liberal 
constitutional imagination, the idea of the rule of law is firmly part of it, albeit a 
notoriously contested concept in its own right.152  
The liberal aspect of authoritarian liberalism comes instead from a liberal 
economic teleology. The measures that are implemented, whether to ‘stabilize’ 
(ESM, OMT) or prevent future financial crises (Fiscal Compact), are aimed at 
continuing the process of market integration, fostering competitiveness between 
national economies, and ensuring neo-liberal structural reform in order to respect 
economic freedom.  
And the presiding symbol of this new teleology of economic liberalism is the 
Euro-currency itself, the survival of which is said to represent the fate of the 
Euro-polity. Like the gold standard of the 1920’s, the pressure to maintain the 
Euro now submits politics to an overwhelming economic rationality.153 The Euro 
is ‘irreversible’, or so we are told.  
This new ‘economic Messianism’ — a belief that only neo-liberal economics 
can redeem politics — requires ‘liberal interventionism’, where even market norms 
such as sovereign yields are subject to constitutional override in order to generate 
or replicate economic rationality under conditions that respect the ‘irreversibility’ 
of the Euro.’154 This causes not only political but also domestic constitutional 
backlash. It is no surprise that conflict between domestic courts and the ECJ, long 
simmering, finally spilled over in the OMT reference.  
The new constitutional configuration would thus be appositely characterized 
as based on the pursuit of a ‘militant economics’ rather than a ‘militant 
democracy’.  Projects of capital accumulation, it now seems, no longer need to be 
protected only from social democracy, or from monopoly capitalism, but from the 
market itself and its apparent ‘irrationality’ (if left to its own devices the market 
would have resolved unsustainable Greek debt in a different way from that 
imagined by the ECB).  
In the absence of strong bonds of supranational community or transnational 
solidarity, technocratic regulation represents the principal defence in maintaining 
the European project, and particularly its central symbol, the Euro. But now, even 
this is under threat, with the placing of ‘Grexit’ on the table by German Finance 
Minister Wolfgang Schaüble; here we are firmly playing outside the rules, or 
playing a different game altogether: there is no legal option of exit from the single 
currency.155 
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The problems are not shallow. They reflect increasing horizontal tensions, 
fraught relations between the Member States as much as between state and EU. In 
the current geo-political constitution of Europe, constitutional authority in one 
country can condition and even prevent the normal functioning of constitutional 
authority in another country: with rescue funds viewed in zero-sum terms, a 
constitution that protects democratic authority in Germany can conflict with one 
that protects social rights in Greece (as well as undermine the constitution 
defended by the ECJ). Although Germany, for example, was able to exert 
ordoliberal pressure on the rescue measures through legal complaints against the 
ESM and OMT, on the basis of a violation of the rights of the Bundestag to 
determine its own economic policies, less attention is paid to legal complaints 
advanced in peripheral countries, such as Greece or Portugal, of violations of the 
social rights of their citizens through the austerity measures imposed (or 
previewed) in the same rescue programmes by the Troika.156  
German ordoliberal ideology, an increasingly dominant reference point, 
however far from a reality, is looking incompatible with constitutional democracy 
in other parts of the Eurozone, particularly when Germany makes having a trade 
surplus a “de facto reason of state”.157 It is not clear that a ‘German Europe’, even if 
desirable, is in any way constitutionally feasible. Germany cannot coherently insist 
that all other states have a macro-economic policy that looks like its own, ‘because 
such a result is definitionally impossible’ — as regards intra-EU trade, in order for 
some countries to enjoy a trade surplus, others must sport a trade deficit.158 If 
democracy, no longer a right, must now be understood as a reward for fiscal 
discipline, this is a reward that could realistically only ever be offered to some.  
Constitutional imbalance is now increasingly apparent.159 This may be 
reaching a tipping point. The survival of the Euro requires the solidarity between 
members that is ruled out by its own constitution. With the constitutional 
challenge to OMT, the immovable object of ordoliberalism threatens to meet 
head-on the irresistible force of functional economic integration in a showdown 
between Europe’s most powerful courts. Neither object nor force shows concern 
for the values of democratic constitutionalism, an indifference which in turn 
provokes domestic political and social backlash.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
156 See Kilpatrick, above.  
157 Helen Thompson, ‘Austerity as Ideology: The Bait and Switch of the Banking Crisis’, Comparative 
European Politics 11 (2013): 729–736, at 730. 
158 Id. 
159 See Mark Dawson and Floris De Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance after the Euro-Crisis’, Modern Law 
Review 76 (2013): 817–844.  
                         05/2016 
 
 34 
6. BACK TO THE FUTURE? 
 
Each of the three supports of postwar European integration discussed above — 
conditioning (German) state sovereignty, constraining political democracy, and 
curtailing economic excesses — are now under considerable pressure. German 
hegemony, anti-systemic social movements and domestic political parties of both 
Left and Right, and severe economic crises have returned. The Eurozone has seen 
deflation and even ‘secular stagnation’, which, combined with severe 
unemployment rates in the periphery, recalls conditions in the era of the Great 
Depression.160   
The domestic constitutions of many European states are increasingly shaped 
by external pressures in what looks like new forms of imperialism and hegemony. 
To be sure, these pressures caused by tensions between democracy and capitalism 
of course exist outside the Eurozone, and outside the EU as well as within it.161 
They extend beyond Europe’s imposition of conditionality as a prerequisite for 
financial aid in the Eurozone periphery. Rather, they reflect the broader potential 
for capitalist imperialism brought about in an age where the acquisition of territory 
is no longer considered necessary to exert economic control over another state. A 
trade surplus is sufficient, as Claus Offe notes with Hungary, an EU member state 
but not even inside the Eurozone. 162    
And yet the EU itself is existentially threatened; to the extent that it has any 
cures at its disposal, these seem only to worsen the symptoms, hampered by its 
constitutionalised treaty obligations and reluctance to discard neo-liberal and 
ordoliberal economic ideology. It also has a history to take into account. 
‘Receivership’, it has been argued, is too mild a term for the suspension of normal 
democratic process that countries in the periphery have been reduced to: 
‘occupation’ by the Troika is more appropriate, suggesting as it does, analogy to 
“the consequences of military defeat.”163 As Fritz Scharpf puts it:  
 
Institutionally, agreement to these conditionalities were not defined by 
European legislation under the Community method or through consensus 
voting in the Council but through extremely asymmetric bargaining between 
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creditor and debtor governments that resembled conditions of an 
unconditional surrender.164 
 
This new form of imperialism is bound to elicit strong social and political 
reaction: austerity imposed — (however much apparently self-imposed) — on 
peripheral euro-zone states in exchange for short-term economic bail-outs, ‘risks 
letting loose the kind of political passions that were so destructive during the inter-
war years.’165 
These passions should be fought, according to the liberal constitutionalist, 
recall, by ‘militant democracy’, striking against any perceived threat to the 
established constitutional or economic order. This discourse of militant 
interference has explicitly returned, most prominently in relation to the EU’s 
response to Hungary’s jump to the Right and its increasingly illiberal authoritarian 
rule.166 The link between the financial crisis bailouts and the reactionary turn to 
illiberalism in Hungary has only tentatively been explored.167 But militancy is 
undoubtedly an apposite characterization of the response to the perceived threat 
to the established order posed by Syriza in Greece. According to Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘forcing the Greek government to agree to an economically 
questionable, predominantly symbolic privatisation fund’ could not be understood 
as ‘anything other than an act of punishment against a left-wing government.’168    
There is an alternative narrative of Weimar’s decline, however, which would 
suggest a different lesson than one focused solely on how the EU should 
militantly react to political extremes or perceived threats to the rule of law. It 
would demand deeper consideration of why a threat to the constitutional order 
emerged in the first place. Hermann Heller, recall, attributed Weimar’s decline not 
to excessive democratic equality or tolerance (or even to excessive private, 
monopolistic control of government), but to liberalism’s own inability to respond 
to — and its complicity in — excessive socio-economic inequality.169 It was this socio-
economic collapse that one should focus on in order to understand liberalism’s 
internal contradictions and ultimate demise.  
Heller’s narrative depends on recognition — occluded by liberal 
constitutionalists — that Weimar did not move directly from liberal democracy to 
National Socialism, but went through the interregnum of ‘authoritarian liberalism’. 
In this period the liberal constitutional State (under a succession of conservative 
and centrist Chancellors beginning with Brüning’s administration from 1930–
1932) went to great lengths to avoid the re-differentiation of politics and the 
                                                      
164 Scharpf, above, 389 
165 Thompson, above, 730. 
166 See Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Should the EU Protect the Rule of Law and Democracy Inside Member 
States?’, European Law Journal 21 (2015): 141–160. Cf. Paul Blokker, New Democracies in Crisis: A Comparative 
Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Routledge, 2013).  
167 See Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Constitutions, Social Rights and Sovereign Debt States in Europe: A 
Challenging New Area of Constitutional Enquiry’, EUI Working Paper, Law (2015/34) 
168 The Guardian, Thursday 16th July 2015.  
169 See, e.g., Hermann Heller, ‘Political Democracy and Social Homogeneity’ in B. Schlink and A 
Jacobson (eds) Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000) 265.  
                         05/2016 
 
 36 
economy that was threatened by radical social democratic movements, as well as 
by National Socialism.  
Authoritarian liberals insisted on a centralized fiscal orthodoxy, rejecting calls 
for relaxation of austerity and obstructing any social democratic response to 
economic crisis. Such obstruction, ‘undermining both vocational and regional 
autonomy’ would occur by replacing parliamentarism with administrative 
directives. This was supported by many liberals of the period, because radical 
social democracy was perceived to be a great threat to the constitutional order, 
either on its own terms, or because of what it was suspected of leading to.170 And 
liberals would continue to insist, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that if 
only left to its own devices, market liberalism ‘would have delivered the goods’; 
that it was not liberalism but a planned socialist conspiracy that ended the 
prospect of peace and prosperity in the interwar years.171 This stubbornly critical 
approach to social democracy wasn’t restricted to the German authoritarian 
liberals, Austrian liberal von Mises noting that despite the dangers of fascism and 
its makeshift nature, it will be forever acclaimed for saving the continent from 
socialism and the attendant dangers to private property, approving Engelbert 
Dolfuss’s crushing of labour and social democracy in Austria in the 1930’s.172 
Inequality — always the Achilles heel of liberalism — has returned to 
prominence as a political problem, in Europe as well as globally,173 reactivating 
debates from the Weimar period, and even from further back to the French 
revolutionary foundations of the Rousseauian constitutional tradition.174 Clear 
echoes of Heller’s claim are evident today, despite the many differences in the 
constitutional landscape of contemporary Europe.175 Material freedom for the 
many and not just the few remains elusive. This is emerging as a constitutional 
problem.  
And as meticulously recounted by Karl Polanyi, the breakdown of liberalism 
and turn to Fascism in this interwar interregnum was itself a global phenomenon, 
and one directed primarily by the political response to the market system and the 
submission of politics to economic rationality entailed by slavish adherence to the 
international gold standard.176 The extraordinary pressure built up in an effort to 
maintain the gold standard, compelling monetary contraction, deflation and severe 
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unemployment in the interwar period, would eventually be released in spectacular 
fashion. The path this unilateral abandonment of international norms would then 
take varied a great deal: from the New Deal in the US, to Welfarism in Britain and 
National Socialism in Germany.  
Where market liberal ideology was strongly maintained and social democracy 
repressed in practice by authoritarian means, with the market suspended but only 
in the interests of the ruling class and business elites, the conditions were created 
for a ‘counter-movement’ of devastating proportions. In this critical decade, ‘the 
stubbornness with which economic liberals’ had supported authoritarian liberal 
interventionism, ‘merely resulted in a decisive weakening of the democratic forces 
which might otherwise have averted the fascist catastrophe’.177 
To reiterate a crude assertion: Europe’s post-war liberal constitutionalism 
focused too much on the legal manner of Weimar’s decline to the neglect of its 
social, economic and political causes. Not politically democratic excesses, but 
economically liberal excesses need to be considered. It was, in Polanyi’s reading, 
market liberal excesses and concomitant democratic deficiencies which paved the 
way towards Fascism.  
And yet eager for ideological reasons to avoid the appearance of undermining 
democracy, liberal constitutionalists instead developed myriad devices to justify 
restricting democracy to ‘save democracy from itself’ (or what Loewenstein 
termed “fight[ing] fire with fire”).178 But dressing up a fear of democracy as itself a 
kind of democracy — even a militant democracy — leads to all sorts of contortions 
and distortions that confound the field of liberal constitutionalism to this day. 
 ‘Militant democracy’ was always an odd expression for a philosophy that 
meant its opposite, i.e., that democracy must be restricted and curtailed in order to 
serve ‘liberal’ (and what would today be ‘neo-liberal’) ends.179 Emasculated by the 
liberal constitutionalist, ‘democracy’ becomes indistinguishable from the rule of 
law. There is little regard for the substantive political or social commitments, or 
for the requisite social conditions that are necessary for ‘democracy’ or the ‘rule of 
law’ to remain a functional and stable part of Europe’s ‘constitutional’ order.  
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
European integration can be cast as a partial solution to a multi-faceted problem: 
how could the modern constitutional state — and the set of ideas on which it is 
based — survive in the aftermath of the series of devastating shocks suffered in 
the first half of the twentieth century? How might it repair or rebuild its political 
foundations in the post-war period? These questions now need to be posed again.  
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The legacy of Europe’s liberal democratic constitutionalism is under 
extraordinary pressure in contemporary conditions. In reaction to authoritarian 
liberalism (to further de-democratisation, and even de-legalisation) there has been 
an extraordinary re-politicisation of Europe’s geo-political, societal, and economic 
constitutions. Resistance to conditionality and austerity, for example, is emerging 
through anti-systemic social and political movements, as ‘post-liberal’ (as well as 
more entrenched and atavistic nationalist) alternatives to the current configuration 
of authoritarian liberalism and militant economics are starting to be explored, in 
both Left and Right variants.  
And yet, whilst European and domestic political elites have attempted to 
cajole, coerce and micromanage the threat to economic liberalism from the Left in 
Greece (and elsewhere), it has been virtually impotent in response to the threat to 
political liberalism from the Right in Hungary (or elsewhere), despite the fact that 
left-wing movements are pan- and almost invariably pro-European in outlook. 
Response and reaction to the Eurocrisis so far is squarely in line with what Heller 
and Polanyi deemed to be liberalism’s structural authoritarianism.  
Will the attempt to recover the autonomy of the political from liberal-
economic militancy, as pursued by more radical social movements such as Occupy 
and the Indignados, and articulated as a domestic and European programme by 
political parties such as Syriza and Podemos, lead to a reclaiming of political-
democratic power over the economic realm? In reaction to the hegemony of 
ordoliberal and neo-liberal de-politicisation, the basic social and political functions 
of democratic constitutionalism can, it seems, only be regained from the ‘bottom-
up’, through radical reassertion of constituent power. They will not be obtained 
without a struggle, as European and domestic elites attempt to repress them at all 
costs.  
Can this occur within the Eurozone or even the European Union in 
conditions of global capitalism? The final irony may be that even for liberal 
democratic constitutionalism to have any purchase in the 21st century, the issue of 
the social inequalities — both within and between states — that are structurally 
reproduced by liberal capitalism can no longer be deferred. It seems, however, that 
they can be resolved neither by the Member States, nor by the Union of which 
they are part, at least as currently configured. Will this impotence lead to a more 
spectacular outburst of right-wing populism in due course, potentially armed with 
a more visible enemy as Europe struggles to deal with a refugee and migrant crisis? 
Or is there still a chance, as Heller thought, in yet more turbulent times, that a 
pan- European democratic solidarity might emerge? 
 
